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Social Security Benefits:
An Empirical Study of Expectations and Realizations
ABSTRACT
I employ data drawnfrom theRetirement History Survey to study
theaccuracy of pre—retirement expectations concerning social security
benefits. The major findings of this study are as follows. First,
survey responses to questions about expected benefits are reasonably
noisy.However, when one properly filters outthe noise, reported forecastsappear to explain roughly 60% of the variance in realizations.
Second, consumers do not form expectations on the basisofall available
information. Proper adjustment offorecasts for information contained
in concurrent social security entitlements could reduce the residual
forecast error variance by roughly 15%.Thepotential gains from
incorporating other information areminimal.Third, individuals do not
ignore or forget information which they have used in the past, and they
tend to formallexpectations on the basisofthe same information.
Fourth,expectations are highly accurate, given the information that
people do use. Extreme optimism Is uncommon. Surprisingly, expecta-
tions were not abnormally inaccurate during periods of rapid legislative
change. Fifth, of various population subgroups, widows and single women
tend to makeboth the most conservative and most accurate forecasts.
Married menare leastconservative and least accurate. Accuracy and
conservativism are not systematicallyrelated towealth or education.
Finally,individual behavior appears toconform more closely to the






Expectations play a key role in modern life cycle theory. This is
something of an embarrassment to applied economists, since perceptions
are not, in general, directly observable. Little if any existing
evidence sheds light on the plausibility of central life cycle tennets,
which hold thatconsumersthink seriously and coherently about the
relativelydistant and uncertain future. The extent to which financial
hardship among the elderly stems from myopia and inept financial
planning therefore remains largely a matter of speculation. In
addition, economists are frequently forced to invoke a variety of strong
assumptions concerning the structure of expectations in order to
identify behavioral models (e.g. many studies are based on the
supposition that consumers understand the SocialSecurity benefit
formulae,and form their expectations "rationally").Specific empirical
resultsoften depend heavily upon the nature of these assumptions.An
excellentexample of this appears in the literature on Social Secrity
and personal saving: when employing macroeconomic data, one can obtain
virtually any desired result by altering assumptions concerning
expectations (see Leimer and L.esnoy's [1981] criticism of Feldatein
[1974]).Thestudy of expectations is therefore absolutely central to a
comprehensive understanding of life cycle behavior.
Previousempirical work on household expectations has focused
primarily on inflation (see Huizinga [1980], Curtain [1982], Gramlich
[1983], and Papadia [19821; Aiginger 11981] considers a somewhat broader
range of variables). To my knowledge, there hasbeenno previous—2—
systematicanalysis of expectations and realizations among the
elderly. Since the concerns and characteristics of the elderly differ
from those of the non—elderly, it would be unwisetogeneralize from
existing evidence when considering problems associated with aging.
In this paper, I employ data drawn from the Social Security
Administration's Retirement History Survey (RHS) to study the accuracy
ofpre—retirement expectations concerning social security benefits.
Thisemphasis on social security isappropriate, since program benefits
are typicallythe most important single financial resource of retired
individuals, comprising on average more thanhalf ofnet wealth (see
Bernheirn[1987a3).In a separate piece (Bernheim 11987b]), I examine
theaccuracy of expectations concerning the timing of retirement.
The major findings of this study are as follows.
1.Surveyresponses to questions about expected social security
benefitsare reasonably "noisy". It isextremely important to bear this
inmind when interpreting the data. When one filters out the noise
appropriately, it appears that consumers do think seriously about future
events, and report expectations which may well reflect, albeit
imperfectly, their true beliefs. Indeed, respondentst forecasts explain
roughly 60% of the variance in realizations.
2. Consumers do not form expectations on the basis of all
available information. The data strongly suggest that individuals
ignore a great deal of information contained in concurrent social
securitystatutes.Properadjustment forthis information could reduce
theresidual forecast error variance by roughly 15%. There is also—3—
somewhatweaker evidence that consumers at least partially ignore
certain demographic factors which help to predict future events.
However, the potential gainsfrommore refined use of demographic
informationappear minimal——proper adjustment would reduce the residual
forecast error variance by at most 5%.
3.The evidence is broadly consistent with the view that
individuals use the same information to form expectations concerning a
variety of different variables (social security benefits, other income,
and date of retirement). When forming expectations concerning social
security,individuals do not appear to ignoreinformation upon which
they base other expectations at the same point in time. In addition,
consumers have good memories, in that they do not ignore information
upon which they based expectations at previous points in time.
4.Peopleseem to be reasonably competent at forming relatively
accurate expectations conditional upon the information that they do
chose to use. In addition, it is somewhat comforting to note that few
individuals exhibit the kind of extreme optimism that might be
responsible for catastrophic errors in financial planning; indeed, there
is a general bias towards conservativism. Surprisingly, there is very
little evidence to support theviewthat expectations were abnormally
inaccurate during periods of significant statutory reform. Indeed, the
data broadly suggest that consumers correctly anticipated the general
effects of legislative action during the early 70's, contrary to the
supposition of most previous authors (see e.g. Hurd and Boskin—4—
[1981]).Data on retirement expectations bear this conclusion out
(see Bernheim [198Th]).
5. Of various population subgroups, widows and single women tend
to form both the most conservative (i.e. low relative to realizations),
andmost accurate (judged by correlations or mean squared errors)
forecasts. The forecasts of married men are the least conservative, and
least accurate. There is no evidence that thepoor, or those with
relativelylittle education have particular difficulties forming
accurate expectations.
6. The properties of reported expectations conform more closely
to theory as retirement grows imminent. This suggests that individuals
maybecome more serious about forming expectations with the approach of
retirement.
Thepaper is organized asfollows. Section 2 describes a general
conceptualframework for analyzing social security expectations.
Section3 contains a description ofthe data.Simpletabulations of the
rawdataappear in sectIon 4.Section5containsregression results
whichpermit formal testing of certain aspects of the conceptual
framework. While the results are generally unfavorable, I attribute
this to the noisiness of reported expectations. I take up the issue of
measurementerror in section 6, andpresent new results which motivate
manyof the conclusions described above. Section 7 summarizes my
findings, and discusses directions for subsequent research.—5—
2. A Conceptual Framework
It is plainly unreasonable to expect that an elderly person could
predict without error his financial resources several years hence.
Uncertainty is simply a fact of life. For purposes of conducting
behavioral analyses and designing public policy, the relevant issue is
whether individuals have learned to deal with this uncertainty as well
as their circumstances allow. Economists frequently employ the
assumption that households form their expectations "rationally," in the
sense that they are not fooled systematically, and furthermore, that
their forecasts are as precise as possible conditional upon available
information. Given data on expectations, one can test this hypothesis
in a variety of ways. One approach is to determine whether or not
forecast errors are systematically related to information which the
individual possesses (or has access to) at the time his forecast is
made. If they are, then one can actually identify the kind of
information which individuals either ignore, or use improperly. Another
approach is to examine the accuracy of predictions, and to see whether
they become more accurate as knowledge improves. In this section, I
develop these ideas formally.
Suppose that at each point in time, t =0,1,...,T —1,an
individual forms an expectation, X, about the value of same variable
X, which is realized at time T. During period t, he has access to
certain information, which I denote as Throughout, I assume that
the individual's memory is perfect, so that all information available at
time t is also available in period v > t.—6—
In subsequent sections, I interpret X as social security
benefits, and T as date ofretirement.iJ When an individual reports
expected social security benefits, there is, of course, some ambiguity
as to what this means. While he may have in mind something like a
mathematical expectation, it is also possible that his report reflects
his view of the most likely outcome (i.e., the mode). As long as the
distribution of X is approximately symmetric and single—peaked, this
ambiguity is probably of very little consequence. Throughout, I
therefore focus on the hypothesis that individuals report expected
values, i.e.
(1) x =E(X￿)
From equation (1), one can derive a number of simple testable
implications, which I summarize below as properties I through 4.
Property 1: Realizations should exhibit more variability than
forecasts.
Property 2: The variability of forecasts should increase as the
date of realization approaches.
Property 3: The variance of the forecast error should decline as
the date of realization approaches.
Property 4: The correlation between forecasts and realizations
should rise as the date of realization approaches.—7—
The intuition for these results is straightforward. Different
individuals should make different forecasts only if their information
differs. Thus, as individuals acquire more differentiated information,
forecasts should become more heterogeneous. Since Information improves
over time, property 2 follows naturally. Notealsothattheimprovement
of information Immediately suggests properties 3 and 4,which
essentially statethat forecastsbecome more accurate as the date of
realization approaches, Pinally, since a realization Is equivalent to a
forecast based upon perfect information, realizations should exhibit
more heterogeneity thanforecasts(property 1).Irefer the reader to
appendix A for formal demonstrations.
Tests of the four properties listed above canhelpto determine
whether or not consumers efficiently process available information. If
these tests should fail, further Investigation would be warranted. In
particular, one would want to identify the kinds of information that
individuals tend to ignore or process incorrectly. It is possible to
shed some light on this issue by adopting a somewhat different
approach. Specifically, equation (1) suggests the following regression
framework:
(2) =a+ ÷w1y +
wherethe w arevariablesthatare observableat time t (i.e.
elements of Qft). Theory implies that a =0,=1,y =0,and that
isorthogonal to and Thus, least squares estimation of
(2) generates an additional set of tests../ In addition, it allows us to—8—
isolateparticular types of information which consumers fail to process
correctly, and to determine the direction and magnitude of the resulting
forecast bias. Noteinaddition thatbyomitting from the
regression, one cantesta weaker proposition——that individuals form
unbiased (conditional upon the information thattheydo use), although
possibly inefficient expectations (a =0,=i).
3.tta
The data for this study aredrawnfrom the Social Security
Administration's Retirement History Survey (RHS), whichfolloweda
sample of retirement—aged households (58 to 63 years old in 1969) for a
period of 10 years, beginning in 1969. Wach household was surveyed once
every twoyears(1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, and 1979). Although the
initial wave included more than 11,000 households, there was substantial
attrition over successive waves.
In 1969, 1971, and 1973, respondents reported the level of social
security benefits thattheyexpected to receive upon retirement. In
subsequent sections, the variable ESS (expected social security)
reflects answers to these questions, adjusted to an annual basis.
Unfortunately, data on expected benefits were extremely poor in 1969.
Casual inspection revealed a low resonse rate (due in part to survey
skip patterns), as well as a high frequency of nonsensical values. I
have therefore confined attention to responses given in 1971 and 1973.
Unfortunately, interpretation of expected benefits is somewhat
problematic, in thatthetreatment of inflation is ambiguous.—9.-
Certainly, the survey instrument does not specify whether the individual
is to report a real or nominal figure. Throughout, I simply assume that
respondents report expected benefits in current (i.e. survey year)
dollars. This seems the most natural choice, since respondents would
otherwise have hadtoforecast future inflation ratesbeforeformulating
an answer to the question. To the extent my assumption is incorrect,
the scale of expectations may be somewhat off.
The primary advantage of the RHS is that it allows the analyst to
identify realizations by employing data from subsequent survey waves.
In the case of social security benefits, this process is somewhat
involved.While respondents areaskedto report social security income
in each survey year, these data are of questionable reliability. For
example,it isnot uncommon tofind householdswhich first report the
receiptof benefits in a particular year, only to report no social
security income in one or more of the subsequent waves. Furthermore,
reported benefits frequently vary by 50%ormore between consecutive
waves.Since most of this undoubtably reflects "noise", the use of such
data would introduce spurious forecast error. I therefore opt to use
calculated values instead. The calculation procedes in several steps.
First, I Identify the year in which each repondent began to
receivesocial security benefits. While it is safe to assume that
individuals rarely report the receipt of benefits when they in fact
receive none, failure to report positive benefits does not necessarily
indicatethat nonehave been received (see above). accordIngly, I use
theminimum of the dateatwhich each respondent first reported social—10—
security income, and the respondent's reported date of retirement.
Unfortunately, respondents are never asked to report their dates of
retirement directly. Instead, they indicate whether or not they are
retired at two year intervals. I take the respondent's reported date of
retirement to be the date at which he left his last job prior to first
classifying himself as retired. When the respondent fails to report
this date, I take it to be midway between successive survey years (i.e.
in the year prior to the survey year when he first reports himself as
retired).
Second, I calculate yearly social security income for each
individual by compiling his earnings history, and applying the benefit
formula in effect during the year when he first beganreceiving
benefits. Fortunately, the social security administration has provided
matching administrative records on official earnings histories through
1975——theSSAuses these same data to calculate henef its In practice.
These records are,ofcourse, incomplete for individuals who began to
receive benefits after 1975. In these cases, I use survey data on
reported earnings after 1975 to complete the records. While survey data
are available only through 1979,thisturned out to be immaterial——
according to the criterion described above, no Individual who reports an
expected benefit in either 1971 or 1973 actually began to receive social
security benefits after 1979.
As described in section 2, part of my objective is to relate
forecast errors to available information, in order to identify the kinds
of information that individuals either Ignore or process incorrectly.—11—
consider two dozen informational variables, which I group into three
distinct categories.
The first category contains variables which measure other reported
expectations. The inclusion of these variables allows me to determine
whether or not individuals have internally consistent expectations, in
the sense that they base all expectations on the same set of
information. By including lagged expectations, I can test the
hypothesis that individuals have good memories, in the sense that they
neverignore information which they employed at some prior point in
time. Definitions of specific variables follow.
ERET:expecteddata of retirement.
EOI: expectedretirement income, other than social security
LESS:expected social security income, reported in thepreceding
survey wave.
LERET: expected date of retirement, reported in the preceding
survey wave.
LEOI:expected income other than social security, reported in
thepreceding survey wave.
Data on expectations is, of course, incomplete—-many individuals who
reportexpectedsocialsecurity benefits do not, for example, report an
expecteddate ofretirement. Accordingly, I also use dummy variables,
whichequal I ifthe individual reports the associated expectation, and
ootherwise.I refer to the dummies corresponding to the five
expectational variables listed above as DRET, DOl, LDSS, LDRET, and
LDOI, respectively.—12—
The second category includes a single variable, which is the
individual's current social security entitlement, CSS, defined as the
level of benefits he would receive under current law if he retired
immediately. CSS is, theoretically, part of each individual's
information set, in thatitdepends only upon his own past earnings
history, and upon current law (which is public information). i3y
including CSS, it is possible to determine the extent to which
individuals ignore information related to existing statutes.
The third and final category includes various demographic
variablesand other household characteristics which might be useful in
predicting future social security benefits. The list of variables
includes:
MAR: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the respondent
is married (1 =married,0 =other).
DIV: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the respondent
is divorced (1 =divorced,0 =other).
WID: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the respondent
is a widow or widower (1 =widowor widower, 0 =other).
AGE: the respondent's age.
SAGE: the respondent's spouse's age.
ED: the respondent's level of educational attainment (measured
in number of years).
SED: the respondent's spouse's level of educational attainment.
W: the household's net wealth (including financial assets,
businesses, and real property).—13—
GH: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
respondent reports his health as being better than
average for his age (1 =better,0 =other)
BH: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
respondent reports his health as being worse than average
for his age (1 =worse,0 =other).
KIDS: number of children.
COMPRET: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
respondent's employer maintains a compulsory retirement
age (1 =compulsoryretirement, 0 =nocompulsory
retirement).
MOVE: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
respondent has moved within the past two years.
Beforepassing onto analysis of the data, it is important to
discusstwo potential problems. The first concerns sample selection
biases. I drop observations from the analysis for four reasons: i)the
respondentfails to report expected social security benefits, ii)
reported expectations are obviously nonsensical, iii) data on net wealth
areInadequate,or iv) the household disappeared from the RHS prior to
receiving social security benefits. Note that the first three items all
reflecthousehold characteristics that areknownwhenthe respondent
makeshis forecast. According to theory, these factors should therefore
be uncorrelated with the forecast error——dropping these observations
should not bias the regression results. The fourth item (subsequent
attrition)does reflect events occurring after the forecast was made,—14—
and therefore may well be correlated with the forecast error.
Nevertheless, this seems relatively unlikely. Attrition occurs
primarily because of death, or because the respondent has moved. Death
is, of course, highly correlated with realized social security benefits,
in the trivial sense that an individual who dies prior to retirement
receives nothing. However, I strongly suspect that individuals report a
conditional (upon survival) expectation (i.e. the respondent thinks, if
I live until retirement, what will I get?) If so, no sample selection
bias arises. When attrition occurs for other reasons, one cannot make
the same argument. However, the RHS did successfully locate many
respondents after they had moved. Consequently, the variable MOVE
should give some indication as to whether the resulting sample selection
bias is significant. As we shall see, the evidence suggests that it is
not.
The second problem concerns the non—independence of realizations.
In a short panel such as the RHS, forecast errors are probably
correlated accross observations, due to "macro" events. Suppose, for
example, that subsquent to the date at which forecasts are recorded,
Congress unexpectedly raises social security benefits by 20%. Then one
would presumably discover that, on average, forecast errors are
significantly positive. One should not construe this as contradictory
to theory, since forecasts may indeed be unbiased given the ex ante
distribution of macro events.
Since the 1970's witnessed several large and potentially
unexpected real increases in social security benefits, this problem is—15—
potentiallysevere. I am particularly concerned about the 20% increase
in benefits enacted in September 1972, and the double indexing for
inflation which caused real benefit levels to rise substantially between
1975 and 1977. However, these were, for the most part, across—the—board
increases in benefit levels. As a result, they probably affected little
more than scale. To put it another way, one would not be surprised to
find > 1 in estimates of equation (2), and one should not construe
this as contrary to theory. Indeed, through estimates of ,onecan
hope to discern the extent to which these legislative changes were
actually anticipated. However, one wOuld still expect to find cx =y=0
under the hypothesis that the theory is accurate.
This last remark is somewhat debatable. Legislative changes
during the 70's did alter individuals' budget constraints (see Hurd and
Boskin 119811 for an example). Presumably, this had behavioral
consequences. To the extent different typesofindividuals had
systematically different behavioral response to changes in their budget
constraints, then the corresponding characteristics would, ex post, be
correlated with forecast errors, even if the theory was valid. In the
absence of more extensive longitudinal data, little can be done about
this problem. Thereadershould bear this qualification in mind when
evaluatingthe evidence.
4. AComparisonofForecastsand Realizations
It is possible to learn a great deal about the raw data by
tabulating simple summary statistics. I devote the current section to—16—
this task; sections 5 and 6 containregressionresults.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a general picture of expectations and
realizations, broken down by several different respondent categories,
including married men, widows, widowers, single men, single women,
wealthy married men, and high educated marriedmen./ I report the total
numberofobservations not yet receiving social security, the fraction
of these observations reporting expected social security benefits, the
average expectation along with its standard error, the average
realization for those reporting an expectation, along with its standard
error, the relative mean forecast error (=( — wherebars
denote means), the correlation between expectations and realizations,
and the mean square forecast error.
Consider first the response ratestoquestions about expected
benefits. Since respondents may fail to report expectations for a
variety of reasons, one should not attach too much importance to any
particular rate. However, since the quality of an individual's
information almost certainly affects the likelihood that he will report
an expectation, relative response rates may be informative. The over-
all rate was 42% in 1971, and 40% in 1973. Since the average individual
is closer to his date of realization in 1973 than in 1971, this is
somewhat surprising——one would expect information to improve, and hence
reporting to rise, as individuals approach retirement.
A comparison of response rate across population subgroups reveals
that in 1971, single women and widows were least likely to report


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































likely to respond. One might conclude that the evidence on response
rates does not establish a consistent pattern of Intergroup
differences. On the other hand, it is also possible that women become
substantially more serious about planning for retirement as It
approaches. Single men and widowers have relatively high response
rates, and these rateschangevery little (a slight increase) between
1971 and 1973. In contrast, response ratesformarried men decline
substantiallyover the twoyearinterval. This phenomenon——which is
confined to married men(the aggregate responserate declines simply
becausemarried men dominate thesample)——is rather puzzling. In
addition,neither the response ratesthemselvesnor the decline in these
ratesformarried men Issystematicallyrelated to wealthor education.
Poor, uneducated individuals arejustas likely to report expectations
as their wealthy, highly educated counterparts.
I turn next to the relative mean forecast errors. The data
Indicate thatin1971,theaverageforecastwas about 10%lowerthan the
averagerealization. In 1973, it was about 6% lower. At this level,
the data are consistent with the view that at least some of the
statutory benefit increases during this period were unanticipated.
Note,however, thatthe meanerror was less thatthereal increase in
benefit levels, so these changes were apparently not fully unanticipated
(Boskin[1987] reports that the realbenefit increase in 1972 was
14.1%).Furthermore, weshall see thatfurtherdisaggregationcasts
doubton theviewthatthemeanforecast erroris attributable to
unexpected statutorychanges,—18—
A further point about the overall average forecast error deserves
mention. In conducting regression analysis (see sections 5 and 6), I
also calculated averages for several other variables, including current
social security entitlement (css). Astonishingly, in 1973 the mean
value of expected social security benefits differed from the mean value
of current social security entitlement by only 4Oc. While this may be
largely coincidence, it also raises the possibility that, once
individuals have reached retirement age (recall that respondents are
between 62 and 67 years old in 1973),theyform expectations by
observing the experiences of similarly situated acquaintances who,
unlike the respondent, choose to retire and receive their current
entitlements.
Differencesbetween subgroups are apparent. In 1971, married men
had the smallest relative mean forecast error. Widows and single women
were, on average, furthest off——their expectations tended to be very
conservative. In 1973, widows and single women were still among the
mostconservative, but were joined by married men. The average forecast
for single men was almost right on the nose. Once again, there appears
to be no clear relationship with either education or wealth; if
anything, thedataindicate that the forecasts of educated individuals
tend to befurther off than those of uneducated individuals.
In the second to last collumn of Tables I and 2, I report the
correlationcoefficient between expectations and realizations. Note
thatthis correlation is by far thehighestfor single women and widows
——it is lowest for married men..similarpattern is evident in 1973,—19—
although married men improved their performance relative to other groups
(note that the correlations were generally lower in 1973——more on this
later). Mean squared errors (the final collumn of Tables 2 and 3) also
suggest that, despite their conservatism, women tend to make the most
accurate forecasts, and that married men tend to make the least accurate
forecasts.
I can only speculate as to the causes of this pattern. Unmarried
women (especially widows) nay depend more heavily upon social security
benefitsthan other groups, and may therefore have more of a stake in
acquiring accurateinformation.In contrast, couples mayhavegreater
access to other resources, and nay therefore spend less time thinking
about social security benefits. While this explanation seems plausible,
it is apparently contradicted by the factthat the expectations of
relatively poor married men are notsystematically betterthanthose of
therelatively wealthy, despite the fact that the poor undoubtably
depend upon social security to a greater extent. Conceivably, income
could be correlated with ability, and ability with accuracy; this might
offset any correlation arising from a diminished stake in social
security.
Thedata in Tables I and 2 also allow us to drawsometentative
conclusions concerning properties I —4. Iwill take them in order.
The data for 1971 are superficially consistent with property I
(for each subgroup, the variance of expectations is smaller than the
variance ofrealizations).However, there aretwo reasonstoquestion
thisevidence. First, as mentioned above, the average realization—20—
exceedsthe average expectation by 10. Assuming that this is
attributable to some macro event that increased benefits proportionally
across the boards, one should adjust for scale by inflating the standard
deviation of expectations by 109, in which case the data appear
inconsistent with property 1. Second, the rather smalldifferences
between the standard errors of expectations and realizations suggest
that relatively little new information becomes available between 1971
and retirement. The opposite conclusion is suggested by the rather low
correlations between expectations and realizations. Note finally that
the data for 1973directlycontradict property 1.
While the evidence seems contradictory to theory, strong
inferences may be premature. In view of the fact that actual income is
reported with a high level of noise (see section 3), it seems likely
that expectations are also measured with error. In particular,
respondents may report "ballpark figures" in surveys, despite using a
more precise forecast for planning purposes. Measurement error could
easily account for the apparent failure of property 1. I will return to
this issue in section 6.
Next,note thatthe standard deviations of reported expectations
are substantiallyhigher in 1973thanin1971. Thisis strongly
consistentwith property 2,andsupports the view thatindividuals
remember information which they used to form expectations at previous
points in time4." If the theory is valid, one would expect to flnd this
pattern even in the presence of measurement error.—21—
Properties 3and4indicatethatthemeansquareforecast error
should fall, and the correlation between forecasts and realizations
shouldrise as individuals approach retirement. A comparison of the
data from 1971 and 1973 reveals precisely the opposite pattern. The
mean squared errors rise for every subgroup, and the correlation
coefficient falls for 5 of 7 groups. This suggests either that
individuals process information incorrectly, or, contrary to my
assertion in the preceding paragraph, they ignore information which they
have employed at previous points in time.
Tables 3 and 4providea more disaggregated tabulation of the data
for married men (other subgroups simply did not contain enough
observations to permit similar calculations). In particular, I report
the same set of items broken down by date of expected retirement. Since
retirement Is for the moat part equivalent to realization of social
security benefits, this disaggregation facilitates a more explicit
analysis of properties 2 through 4.Iuse expected date of retirement
rather than the actual date because the actual date is presumably
correlated with information that became available subsequent to the
survey year, and which therefore may well be correlated with forecast
error.
Note first that, in 1971, the fraction of individuals reporting an
expectation declines monotonically with the expected date of retirement.
The same pattern holds in 1973, expect for one aberration (I.e. those
expecting to retire In 1974 had an unsually low response rate). This












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































response rates were lower in 1973.
The relative meanforecasterrors in Tables 3 and 4 merit
particularly close scruitiny. Consider first the results for 1971.
Recall that legislative action raised benefit levels by about 20% in
September of 1972, and that most analysts have thought of this as an
unanticipated change. I have already suggested that the overall mean
forecast error Is at least partially consistent with this view.
However, the disaggregated results arenot.Note that respondents who
expected to retire in 1971, prior to the benefit increase, had the
largest mean forecast error, in most cases by a wide margin. Those
expecting to retire in 1972, 1973, and 1974, after the benefit increase,
had much smaller mean forecast errors, and the magnitudes of these
errors fell well short of the real benefit increase. Forecast errors
were somewhat larger for those intending to retire after 1974, but
smallest of all for those who planned to continue working indefinitely.
A qualitatively similar patternholdsfor 1973. Those expecting
to retire in thecurrentyear hadthesmallest mean forecast error.
However, the magnitude of this error declined monotically with the date
of expected retirement thereafter. Indeed, the mean forecast error was
relatively low for those expecting to retire after 1975, despite the
fact that 1975 through 1977 was the period of double indexing.
Onemight object that expected dates of retirement nay differ
substantiallyfrom actual realizations. If, forexample, those
expectingto retire in 1971 actually worked on average for several more
years, one would not necessarily expect this group to exhibit a—23—
systematicallylower mean forecast error, even if the 1972 legislation
wasunanticipated. In practice, the correspondence between expected and
actual datesofretirement is quite close. Analysis of the data reveals
that the expected date of retirement was always the modal realization.
More specifically, in 1971 approximately 40% of those who expected to
retire in the current year actually did so, while in contrast only 10%
of those expecting to retire in 1972 actually retired in 1971 (see
Bernheim [1987bJformore details). Accordingly, under the view that
the 1972 legislation was indeed unanticipated, one would be hard pressed
to account for the apparent differences between subgroups.
Overall, the evidence contradicts the hypothesis that the overall
mean forecast errors in 1971 and 1973 were attributable to unanticipated
reforms. Individuals do not appear to form systematically less accurate
forecasts during periods of legislative change.
Considernext the pattern of standard deviations on reported
expectations. Property 2 suggests thattheseshould rise as individuals
age. The evidence from Tables 3 and 4 ismixed—-the standard deviation
doesnotmove monotonically with expected date of retirement. This
contrastswith the rather strong evidence in favor of proposition 2
arising from a pure longitudinal comparison (see above).
Turn finally to correlations and meansquared errors. Notethat
in 1971, the correlation between forecasts and realizations declined
almost monotonically with expected dateof retirement (there is a
significantdeparture frommonotonicity for the group intending to
retireafter 1975), while the mean squared error rose rnonotonically.—24—
These results are supportive of properties 3 and 4. The general pattern
is basically the same, although perhaps somewhat weaker in 1973.
Tables3 and 4 also jointly facilitate more refined longitudinal
comparisons. For those who expected to retire in any given year (e.g.
1974), i) the standard error of forecasts rises between 1971and1973,
ii)with only one exception, the mean squared forecast error rises, and
iii) the correlation between forecasts and realizations rises for some
groups, and falls for others. Thefirstobservation is consistent with
property 2; the second is inconsistent with property 3; and the third is
weakly inconsistent with property 4. Thus, disaggregation does not
alter the apparent implications of longitudinal comparisons.
One finalobservation of interest is that the relationship between
expected and realized social security benefits for those who fail to
report an expected date of retirement seems very similar to the
relationship for those who do report such a date. I find this result
somewhat surprising, in that an accurate forecast of one's retirement
date seems essential when one is formulating an expectation about future
social security benefits.
I closethis section by addressing a somewhat differentissue.
Part of themotivation for studying expectations isto determine whether
faulty expectations could be accountable for financial hardship. In the
case of social security benefits, hardship could arise if individuals
tended to be overly optimistic——those anticipating large benefits nay
makeinadequate privateprovisions. In Table 5,Icompute the fraction
ofeach subsample for which expected benefits exceeded actual benefitsTable 5: Overly Optimistic Households:
Selected Subgroups
Population Survey Fraction of Samplewith forecast > realization
subgroup Year bymorethan
5% 10% 25% 50% 100%
Married Men 1971 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.09 0.04
1973 0.40 0.33 0.18 0.11 0.03
Widows 1971 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.01
1973 0.30 0.24 0.150.050.01
Widowers 1971 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.01
1973 0.28 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.01
Single Women 1971 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.00
1973 0.33 0.23 0.08 0.05 0.00
Single Men 1971 0.21 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.07
1973 0.29 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.00
High Wealth Married 1971 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.04
Men
1973 0.41 0.33 0.17 0.10 0.03
Highly Educated 1971 0.27 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.04
Married Men
1973 0.37 0.33 0.18 0.09 0.03
Tothi 1971 0.25 0.220.16 0.080.03
1973 0.37 0.30 0.160.090.02—25—
bymore than 5, 10, 25, 50, and 100%. According to these data,
approximately one in six individuals believes that benefits will exceed
their actual levels by more than 25%; approximately one in twelve
individuals expects over 50 more than they receive; and 29—3% of all
individuals receive less than half of what they expected. Widows,
widowers, and single women are the most conservative groups, although
singlemen are not far behind. Married men are the least conservative,
regardless of wealth or educational attainment.
In interpretingthese numbers, one should bear inmind the
possibilityraised earlier, thatindividuals mayreportexpectations
with substantial noise. If so, Table 5 may substantially exagerate the
extent of excessive optimism.
Since this section hastouchedupon a large number of detailed
points,itis useful to summarize the major findings. Women's forecasts
tendto be relatively conservative, but also the most accurate of any
subgroup. Married men tend to form the least conservative and least
accurateexpectations. Education and wealth appear to have very little
to do with the quality offorecasts. Surprisingly, expectations are not
systematicallyless accurate during periods of significant legislative
changes.While manyindividualsareoverlyoptimistic, this does not
appear tobe anespecially pernicious problem for the vast majority of
households.
Evidence on the theory of expectations developed in section 2 is
mixed. Property I Is generally contradicted by the data, but this is
consistentwith the presence of measurement error. Property 2 is weakly—26—
contradicted by cross—sectional evidence, but supported by longitudinal
evidence. The reverse is true of properties 3 and 4. Overall, the
evidence suggests some incomplete degree of coherence with the theory.
5. Regression Analysis
tn this section I present estimates of equation (2) based upon the
data and variables described in section 3. I provide separateresults
for 1971 and 1973. The 1971 sample contained 1949 observations, while
the 1973 sample included 942 observations.
I will begin with testsofthe comparatively weak hypothesis that
individuals form unbiased (conditional upon whatever information they do
use), although possibly inefficient expectations. That is, I estimate










Inboth cases, the intercept is large and estimated very precisely,
while theslopecoefficient is significantly less than unity.Thepoint
estimates imply that, if an individual responds to information by-27-
raising his expected benefits $1, hisrealization will,on average, rise
by roughly 50+. This qualitative pattern persists when other
informational variables are added.
Table 6 contains estimates of equation (2) where includes the
full complement of informational variables described in section 3. In
1971,alarge numberofinformational variables have statistically
significant coefficients. These include the respondent's expectation of
other income (EoI), current social security entitlement (CSS), age (AGE
and SAGE), education (ED and SED), poor health (PH), number of children
(KIDS), and compulsory retirement (COMPRET). Marital status(MAR,Dlv,
WID) does not appear to matter, nor does mobility (MOVE).Wealth (w)is
marginallysignificant.
In 1973,fewerinformational variables have statistically
significant coefficients. As before, CSS plays an important explanatory
role. Notethat the1973regressionsalso include lagged expectations
(thiswas not possible in 1971 due to data quality). LESS, the lagged
value of social security benefits, appears with a very significant
coefficient, which suggests that individuals nay have poor memories.
Aside from CSS and LESS, only ED enters significantly.
These results strongly contradict the theory of expectations
outlined in section 2. Unfortunately, interpretation of the
coefficients is problemmatic. Since the coefficient of ESS is in
general rather small, other variables are probably explaining the
magnitude of actual benefits, rather than the forecast error.Table 6: Regressions of Realizations on Forecasts
Variable 1971 1973 Variable 1971 1973
Intercept 8708 1374 flIV 5.26 41.7
(767) (684) (89.3) (86.5)
ESS 0.286 0.040 WID 22.6 50.2
(0.019) (0.018) (74.1) (71.3)
ERET 13.5 62.8 AGE —133 —19.7
(11.1) (14.2) (12.7) (11.2)
DRET —930 —4670 SAGE 11.9 0.476
(817) (1067) (1.99) (2.17)
E0I/100 1.25 0.763 ED 6.54 5.15
(0.46) (0.613) (2.14). (2.24)
DOl —11.4 21.1 SED —4.57 2.29
(50.4) (63.4) (2.52) (3.07)
LESS 0.129 T4/10 4.03 1.12
(0.029) (2.17) (2.84)
LDSS —331 GH 8.05 —10.2
(68.3) (33.2) (36.3)
LERET 18.2 PH —199 2.46
(14.3) (49.8) (59.1)
LDRET —1310 KIDS —18.6 —7.71
(1055) (7.78) (7.93)
LEOI/100 0.571 COMPRET 203 71.1
(0.614) (56.5) (41.6)
LDOI 37.2 MOVE —40.4 —47.4
(50.4) (49.0) (53.4)




It would, however, be premature to reject the theory on the basis
ofthis evidence alone. As mentioned in section 4, there is some
indication thatreportedexpectations are rather noisy. Measurement
error could account for the positive intercept and smallslope
coefficient. Other informational variables (especially CSS and LESS)
might then help to filter out the noise, in which case they would appear
with spuriously significant coefficients. These observations motivate
the analysis of section 6.
6. ATreantof Measurement Error
Inthis section, I devote serious attention to the possibility
thatexpected benefits are measuredwitherror. I adopt two separate
estimation strategies. The first is to regress forecast errors on
information; the second is to reestimate the regressions of section 5,
instrumentingfor expected benefits. I devote a separate subsection to
each of these approaches. The section closes with an analysis of "true"
forecast errors.
A. ForecastErrorRegressions
Formotivation, I returnto the analysis ofsection 2. Note that
one can rewrite equation (1)as
(3) x—x=
where isuncorrelated with X. Suppose we observe with
error.Inparticular,survey responses measure X,where—29—
(4) x=x+
andwhere and are unoorrelated.Substituting(4)into(3), we
obtain
(5)
By hypothesis is uncorrelated with available information. It is
alsoplausible to assume that is unrelated to other contemporaneous
variables, including the measurement error on these variables.
Accordingly, equation (5)suggeststhe, following regression framework:
(6) — = a+(A)ity + (eit
—
Theorypredicts that a =y=0.Estimates of (6) are not only robust
with respect to measurement error, but also easily interpretable: from
the coefficients y, one can Infer the manner in which individuals
misuse information when constructing forecasts.
Estimates of equation (6) are presented in Table 7. I begin with
the results for 1971.Notefirst that the intercept is usually
statistically significant, which, strictly speaking, is contrary to
theory. However, neither expected date of retirement nor expected other
income appears with a significant coefficient. This supports the
hypothesis that individuals employ an internally consistent set of
information when formulating expects tions.
CSS continues to play an important explanatory role, which
strongly suggests that individuals ignore much of the informationTable 7: Forecast Error Reessions
Variable 1971 1973 Variable 1971 1973
Intercept 3313 —622 WID 16.2 —2.71
(1004) (1412) (98.6) (147)
ERET 3.68 58.0 AGE —55.7 4.93
(14.8) (29.4) (16.6) (23.2)
DRET —240 —4226 SAGE 10.3 —1.54
(1087) (2205) (2.65) (4.49)
E0I/100 —1.05 —1.40 4.41 3.03
(0.612) (1.26) (2.85) (4.63)
DOl —46.1 53.7 SED —9.34 —7.03
(67.0) (131) (3.34) (6.32)
LESS 0.008 WhO4 9.75 10.7
(0.061) (3.18) (5.86)
LDSS —238 GH —14.6 —63.7
(141) (44.2) (74.9)
LIERET —4.35 PH —118 184
(29.4) (66.2) (122)
LDRET 193 KIDS —9.82 —22.0
(2179) (10.3) (16.4)
LEOI/100 —0.509 COMPRET 113 81.2
(1.27) (75.1) (86.0)
LDOI 120 MOVE —39.5 27.2
(104) (65.1) (110)






enbodied in current statutes. The coefficient of CSS is, however,
substantially smaller than in section 5, which Is consistent with the
view that CSS was, in part, filtering the noise in ESS.
Married individuals tend to make high forecasts relative to
realizations——this conclusion is consistent with the simple tabulations
of section 3. The other marital status dummies areInsignificant.
AGE and SAGE both appear significantly. The negative coefficient
on AGE implies that older individuals tend to make high forecasts
relative to realizations. Since the overall mean of expected benefits
is lower than the mean realization, this implies that individuals tend
tomeke more accurate forecasts as they approach retirement. While this
accords with intuition, note that SAGE has the opposite effect.
SED comes in significantly negative. This implies that menwith
highly educated spouses tend tomakeless conservative, and more
accurate forecasts ofbenefits.In contrast, the coefficient of ED is
statisticallyinsignificant.
Wealth enters witha significantly positive coefficient, which
impliesthat wealthier individuals tend tobe morepessimistic relative
torealizations——in this sample, they are on average further off the
mark. This result is consistent with the view that poorer individuals
have a greaterstakein finding out about theirsocial security
benefits. Finally, neither GH, PH, COMPRET, nor MOVE enters with a
significant coefficient.
Turn next to the results for 1973.Surprisingly,FRETappears
with a significant coefficient, which suggests that individuals maynot—31—
form expectations on the basis of an internally consistent set of
information. However, note also that the coefficient of LESS falls to
zero. This is consistent with the view thatthecoefficient of LESS was
significant in section 5 only because ESS was measured with error.
Furthermore, It supports the hypothesis that individuals do not ignore
information which they have used in the past.
As in 1971, the coefficient of CSS is still very significant,
although once again its magnitude has declined. Note also that none of
the other demographic variables or other individual characteristics
enter significantly. Only the coefficient of wealth appears to be even
marginallysignificant.
Insummary, these results suggest that although individuals ignore
Information embodied in current statutes, they do recall the bulk of
information used in the past, and for the most part base all their
expectations on the same set of information. There is mixed evidence
concerning the roles of marital status, age, and education. The partial
correlation between wealth and forecast errors is marginally
significant. Individual characteristicsseemless important in 1973
than In 1971, which is consistent with the view that individuals get
seriousabout planning for retirement as the dateof retirement becomes
more imminent (the apparent role of age confirms this view). Overall,
these results suggest at least a partial degree of coherence with the
theoreticalframework ofsection 2.—32—
B.Inatruented Regressions
Theclassic remedy for measurement error is, of course, the use of
instrumental variables. One requires an instrument thatisuncorrelated
with both and butcorrelated with X. Accordingly, valid
instruments must be related to information which the invididual actually
uses to construct X. Thus, one necessarily tests the basic
expectations hypothesis jointly with the assumption that individuals use
certain information (i.e., that contained in the instruments)
efficiently.
Thisapproach confers two important advantages. First, it allows
one to estimate P.Thisfacilitates a more powerful test of the
theory.In addition, one canalsoallow for the possibility that, due
tothe "macro"events problemdiscussed earlier, the scales of
expectationsand realizations differ slightly. Second, it allows one to
separate true forecast error from measurement error. I persue this
second point in the next subsection.
The choice of instruments is completely arbitrary: one can employ
any inforntional variable, and performtheassociated joint test. I
presentresultsbased uponthe plausible assumption that individuals'
expectationsare internally consistent (i.e., all expectations are based
onthesameinformetion).Accordingly, Iinstrument with the concurrent
expectationalvariables.
As insection4,Ibeginwith tests ofthecomparatively weak
hypothesis thatindividuals formunbiased (conditional upon information
containedin other forecasts, and whatever otherinformation they use),—33—
although possibly inefficient expectations. That is, I estimate
equation (2), omitting all informational variables, c' and










Theseresults are quite striking. In both cases, the intercept
becomes Insignificant, as predicted by theory. The slope coefficient
for 1971 is 1.09, which is consistent with the observation that
forecastsare, on average, about 9 lower than realizations. The slope
coefficient for 1973 is slightly larger. In both cases, the standard
errorsare not terribly large. These estimates strongly support the
viewthat, after a small scale adjustment, reported expectations are
unbiased estimates of realizations, conditional upon the information
contained in other forecasts, and whatever other information individuals
actually use. Results to the contrary (section 5) are apparently
attributable to measurement error.
It is also possible to test jointly for the correct usage of other
information. Accordingly, Table 8 presents regressions of realized
benefits on expected benefits (instrumented), current social securityTable 8: InstrumentedRegressions
Variable 1971 1973 Variable 1971 1973
Intercept 5938 1470 COMPRET 184 66.1
(1305) (974) (62.5) (53.2)
ESS 0.676 0.489 MOVE —41.5 —0.06
(0.126) (0.193) (54.2) (71.0)
























entitlement,and various individual characteristics, for 1971 and 1973,
respectively. In both equations, CSS still enters significantly (in
fact, ESS and CSS roughly divide up the original coefficient on ESS),
although, as expected, the coefficient of CSS is lower than in section
5. This result confirms the view that individuals ignore information
embodied in current statutes. In 1971, AGE, SAGE, ED, SED, W, and PH
all enter significantly, while MAR is nrginal. The direction of each
effect is essentially the same as in section 6A. In 1973, nothing
besides ESS and CSS is statistically significant (AGE and W come
closest). Once again, it appears as though individuals used information
better in 1973, when they were closer to retirement, than in 1971.
As mentioned at the outset of this subsection, there are a variety
of candidates for instrumental variables. The alternative employed
above is not only intuitively appealing, but also yields results that
are highly consistent with the basic theory. However, I have also
estimated equation (2) with other instruments. One set of estimates
tested the basic expectations hypothesis jointly with the assumption
that respondentsmake proper use of available dataondemographic
characteristics when formulating expectations (i.e., I used variables in
the third category as Instruments). Once again, the results supported
the view that, after a small scale adjustment, reported expectations are
unbiased estimates of realizations, conditional upon demographic
variables and whatever other information individuals actually use. The
pattern of coefficients on the informational variables corroborated the—35—
findingsof section 6B.I omit a complete tabulationof the results in
orderto conserve space.
One could also estimate equation (2) by using CSSas an
instrument,thereby testing the basicexpectationshypothesis jointly
with the assumption thatindividualsefficiently use all of the
information contained in CSS. Since the preceding evidence uniformly
contradicts this assumption, it is hardly surprising thattheassociated
results (omitted) are non—sensical.
To summarize, estimates with instrumental variables support the
joint hypotheses that individuals form all of their expectations on the
basis of the same information, and that expectations about social
securitybenefits areunbiased(conditionaluponwhatever information is
usedto construct them) up toasmall scale adjustment. Individuals do
not, however, make efficient use of all available information. Most
importantly, they tend toignore informationembodied in statutory
entitlements.In addition, there is some evidence that forecast errors
arecorrelatedwith age, education, wealth, and health.
C.RecoveringTrue Forecast Errors
One of thecentralobjectives of this study isto assessthe
accuracyof individuals' expectations. If expectational variables are
contaminatedby measurement error, then inferencesbased uponsimple
indecesof accuracy can be highly misleading. Specifically, the
variance of theobserved forecast error reflects both thevariance of
the true forecast error, and the variance ofthe measurement error (see
equation (5)).—36—
Fortunately, it is possible to recover the variance of the true
forecast errors through IV estimates, such as those presented in section
613.I provide a detailed description of the procedure in appendix 13.
In essence, one recovers the variance of the measurement error by
comparing OLS estimates from a regression of SSI on ESS with IV
estimates. One then computes the variance of the true forecast error as
a residual from the variance of the IV regression error. One can also
use this procedure to assess the net reduction in true forecast error
that would result from incorporating new information into the forecast.
To emphasize the importance of correcting for measurement error, I
begin by presenting the unadjusted variances of regression errors
(Table 9). The first row of Table 9 simply provides, as a basis for
comparison, the population variance of realized social security income
for 1971 arid 1973, respectively. The second row contains the variances
of errorterms from IVestimates (using expectational variables as
instruments)of the regressions reported in the text of section 613(i.e.
SSI onan interceptand 1355).Thenext three rows contain the variances
oferror termsfromIVestimates ofregressions thatalso incorporate
otherinformational variables. The regressions corresponding to the
entriesin the final row appear in Table 8; I omit a complete tabulation
of the other regression results in order to conserve space.
If we ignorethefact thatregression errors are contaminated with
measurement error, then the following pictureemerges. In 1971, private
forecastsexplained almost none of the population variance in realized
benefits. In 1973, these forecasts were actually worse than simplyTable 9: Variance of Regression Errors
Independent Variables Variance of Regression Error/105
1971 1973
Intercept Only 9.91 9.59
ESS 9.65 13.58
ESS and CSS 8.36 8.89
ESS anddemographics 6.93 8.99
ESS, CSS, and 5.53 4.51
demographics-37-
namingthe population mean——a finding that is clearly at odds with the
hypothesis that individuals use information rationally. While a
significant improvement results from augmenting the information
contained in ESS with CSS (current entitlements), the proper use of
demographic information seems, on the whole, more important.
When we adjust the numbers in Table 9 for the presence of
measurement error in order to obtain the variance of true forecast
error, a dramatically different picture emerges (see Table 10). Private
forecasts for 1971 now explain 56% of the variance in realized benefits;
1973 forecasts explain 65% of the variance. Note in particular that, as
predicted by theory, the explanatory power of these forecasts is clearly
better in 1973 than in 1971. This finding contrasts sharply with the
results of simple data tabulations (section 4), which in general produce
longitudinalpatterns that are unfavorable to the expectations
hypothesis. We now see thatthesenegative findings are largely
attributable to measurement error.
Table 10 also suggests thatindividualsnake excellent, although
incomplete use of available information. Augmentation of forecasts with
demographic information would achieve a minimal gain (less than a 5%
reduction in residual forecast error variance) in 1971, and no gain at
all in 1973. On the other hand, augmentation with information about
statutory entitlements (css) couldachievea reduction in residual
forecast error variance of between 14% and 17%. Thus, CSS emerges as
the most important piece of information that individuals fail to
incorporate fully into their forecasts.Table 10: Variance of Forecast Errors
Variables used for forecastVariance of Forecast Error/IC5
1971 1973
Intercept only 9.91 9.59
ESS 4.34 3.34
ESS and CSS 370 2.77
ESS and demographics 4.14 3.49
ESS, CSS, and 3.50 2.56
demo graphias—38--
I close this section with one final remark. While the existence
of measurement error is fully consistent with the results of this
section, there is another interpretation of the model described in
equations (3) through (6). Specifically, individuals may not know the
true empirical model, and may form expectations, X, that are related as
in equatIon (5) to the objective expectation, X, by some randomly
distributed term, reflectingidiosynchracies of the individual's
calculations. Under this view, one must adjust one's reading of my
results slightly. Specifically, the IV estimates indicate that
individuals on average form unbiased expectations. Furthermore, the
calculations of this subsection apply to the variance of the forecast
error for a particular individual (i.e., after adjusting the mean for
the Idiosynchratic component), rather than to the population variance.
7. ConcludIngRerks
The evidence In this paper indicates partial coherence with the
theory of expectations outlined in section 2. In addition, inspection
of the data reveal several interesting patterns. I have already
summarized these patternsinthe introduction.
Onepattern does, however, deserve further comment, in that It has
an obvious policy implication. Specifically, the bulk of the evidence
indicates that individuals are simply not completely familiar with their
current statutory entitlements. Presumably, the government could
improveindividuals'forecasts, and hence financial planning, by
providingthis Information. Indeed, there is a precedent in the private—39—
sector. TIAA—CREF provides participants with an annual statement, which
specifies the level of annuity benefits available upon immediate
retirement, and projections of benefits besed on assumptions about
continued employment. Presunbly, the Social Security Administration
could provide each participant with similar information. If necessary,
the program could be restricted to individuals over a certain age.
According to my findings, most individuals would find this quite useful.
This paper leaves many important questions unanswered. In
subsequent work, I plan to focus on the evolution of expectations,
testing the hypothesis that expectations follow a random walk, and
examining the mannerinwhich individuals revise forecasts when
confronted with new information. Inaddition,I plan to explore the
link between expectations and behavior.—40—
AppendixA








(A.4) var(X) < var(X)













(A.9) var(X1) > var(X)
whichisproperty 2.
Further properties follow from combining equations (A.1) and
(A.6). In particular, recursive substitution yields
(A.lo) t = +
since is an element of .the inforntion set (A.2) and (A.7)
then imply that
T-2
(A,11) var(€ )= var(c +var(ii) t ¶=t
Accordingly, we seethat var(X—x) isdecliningin t(property3).
Thefinal property of interest concerns the correlation between




wherethesecondequality follows from (A.1) and (A.2). Combining
(A.12) with (A.9), we see thatp(X,X)is Increasing in t
(property 4).—42—
Note thatequation(A.6) suggests a regression much like equation
(2), and could be used as the basis for additional tests. Although I do
not exploit this relationship here, I do plan to examine the evolution
of expectations in future work.—43—
Appendix B
Consider the forecasting equation







Suppose further that we observe ratherthan X.Substitution of
(A.14) into (A.13) yields
(A.15) =a++ (c—
Let £ — sothat
2 222
(A.16)
Now let OLS be the OLS estimate of 13.As is well known,
2 2
(A.17)
13OLS plim 13OLS =p(X Ti)
Fromthis is follows that
(A.18)
aT)= a2(1—OLS'
One obtains a consistent estimate, a2, of a2 simply by computing
the population variance of X.130L5 is a consistent estimate of—44-
OLS Finally, the IV estimator, is a consistent estimate of .
Thus,
(A.19) —
isa consistent estimator for ci. One obtains a consistent





is a consistent estimator for the trueforecast error,a.
Next suppose thatweaugment the original forecast with some














IV estimation of (A.22) yields consistent estimates, and
of and b. We have already derived a consistent estimator, a2,
of a2. Thus,
2 '2"2 "2
(A.24) a =a —b a
IVT)—45—
isa consistent estimator for the variance of the error termfromthe
augmented forecast.—46—
Footnotes
Here, I abstract from the possibly thatTis itself uncertain.
Itake this issue up in Bernheim [198Th].
31Sincethe variance of should, according to theory, depend
upon t, heterostedasticity is a potential problem. I have
ignoredthis issuethroughout. Calculated standard errors may
thereforebe somewhat inaccurate.
2' TheRHS does not include married women as a separaterespondent
category. When surveying couples, the RHS always classifies the
husband as "respondent," and the wife as his spouse. In this
study, data on social security benefits for married men include
their spouse's benefits. For purposes of categorization, I take
the dividing lines for high wealth and high education to be
$20,000 and tenth grade, respectively——these figures correspond
roughly to medians.
Of course, the 1973 sample is not identical to the 1971 sample, so
caution is warranted. However, the average respondent in 1973 is
1.6 years older than the average respondent in 1971, and
accordingly moreadvancedin the life cycle. It is therefore
appropriate to evaluate properties 2—4 by comparing data from 1971
and 1973.-47-
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